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1.

INTRODUCTION

It is striking how the efforts of the Euro
pean Union to harmonize the laws of its differ
ent member nations in order to create uniform
European Union laws repeat the struggles of the
United States to do the same, in the early years
of the American union. There were a number of
iterations of "harmonization" 200 years ago 1 in
the course of founding the U.S. and a civil war
was fought 150 years ago over what Europeans
today would call the subsidiarity issue. The
American federal power sought to dominate ar
eas which seemed to states to be of more local
concern. Though the Civil War itself ended
1

Articles of Federation and US constitution.
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nearly 150 years ago, the tension- between Fed
eral control and States' rights has never truly
disappeared.
Today in the United States, individual
views about subsidiarity or "states' rights" often
reflect attitudes towards those currently in
power at the federal level. For example, many
who in the U.S. would be characterized as po
litically "conservative" were, for years, the
strongest advocates of states' rights, at a time
when the federal government was dominated by
individuals with more progressive ("liberal"2)
political orientation and agenda. "''hen, how
ever, conservatives achieved federal power dur
ing the Reagan-Bush years, the conservatives
felt no restraint in applying federal force to as
sert their own political perspectives over states
with differing opinions.
These experiences suggest that efforts to
develop a European Union might glean some les
sons from the U.S. experience. It is important
to makc note, however, of one dimension of
European nations that makes their circum
stances different and therefore might lead to dif
ferent results. European nations have deeper
separate histories than the American states, and
-_....._ - _.... _ - - - - 
2
"Liberal" in the United States sense, i.e., more to the political
left as opposed to Liberal in the European sense, i.e., more to the
political right.
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therefore more profoundly different cultures.
This essay will focus on hostile business
takeovers to illustrate the significance that cul
tural differences among nations can play in de
veloping a harmonized European Union law. The
European Union has made several (so far unsuc
cessful) efforts to develop a uniform regulation
of these activities. Cultural differences among
the several Union nations may have helped to
thwart those efforts.
Hostile takeover regulation can serve as
an interesting example of the impact of cultural
diversity, illustrating the differences and simi
larities between U.S. Federal and State laws
(both statutory and judicial) and the struggles
that the current European Community now
faces in developing its own rules and regula
tions. It is generally believed among scholars
and policy-makers that as nations increase their
economic participation internationally, so will
their economic laws and policies take on an in
ternational scope. The received view is that
those internationalizing nations' laws will each
evolve and in so dOing, will naturally gravitate
towards one another and result in uniform in
ternational standards. 3 The reasoning is that
economic forces will cause each nation to de
3 Roberta S. Karmel, "Is it Time for a Federal Corporation Law?", 57
Brookljm Law Review 55, 90 (1991).
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velop laws along efficient lines and as a result
each nation's laws will ultimately meet each
other with the same (efficient) standards. Fur
thermore, not only will these separate efficiency
processes generate uniform legal standards
across those nations, but the standards evolved
will be also the ones that are the most efficient
for the international context. As significant at
tention already has been given academically,
judicially and legislatively to the subject of hos
tile takeovers in the U.S. in the 1980's and the
results are now viewed as essentially settled law,
it seems quite natural for current European ana
lysts to look to U.S. conclusions when consider
ing the EU's and its member nations' efforts to
address the matter for themselves. 4 Indeed many
European scholars and policy-makers have done
so.
In the summer of 2001, however, a Hos
tile Takeover Directive was put before the EU's
European Parliament for approval, a proposal
that was widely regarded as the successful cul
mination of a 12-year collaborative effort to ef
fectuate a common ground on the regulatory
treatment of hostile takeovers within the EU
countries, based on principles similar to the
Guido Ferrarini, "Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the Contesta
bility of Corporate Control," Company Law Reform in OECD Coun
tries. A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, Conference Proceed
ings (forthcoming 2001).
4

[164]
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United States.
The Directive was defeated,
which was the first time since the EU's incep
tion that a Directive of this magnitude did not
succeed. It was defeated in a deadlock tie, in
large part because of the influence of Germany.
One of Germany's major companies had fallen
victim to an international hostile takeover by a
British company less than two years earlier. The
economic importance of the two companies was
so great that the takeover itself was the largest
in history. Some of the German company's vul
nerability was due to differences in Germany's
"economic structure" and "social contract" and
lack of takeover regulations as compared with
Britain, the home of the hostile raider. Clearly
finding common ground among 15 nations
(which are now expanding to 25, with perhaps
more to joinS), even regarding a well-defined
topic such as hostile takeover regulation, is dif
ficult to achieve and even more difficult to sus
tain.
The purpose of this essay is to raise a
number of questions about "received theory"
regarding the evolution of transnational uniform
business law. First, a closer look at history will
challenge the view that nations will naturally
gravitate towards a uniform law. Second, review
of the practicalities will question whether a
5

Frank Bruni, "A10 Countries Sign to Join European Union,"

N. Y. Times, April 17th 2003

IUS GENTIUM· Volume 9

[165]

Barbara White
transnational uniform law in all its aspects is
indeed necessary to have efficiency. Third, a
look at actual cases suggests that the experience
of the United States has not always yielded the
most "efficient" solutions, at least with regard to
economic matters, when applied to European
circumstances.
II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS - THE UNITED STATES'
EXPERIENCE

A. Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regulation
A hostile takeover occurs when an indi
vidual or corporation - the raider - seeks to ob
tain ownership of enough shares to control an
other corporation - the target (Revlon v .. McAn
drews, 1986). What renders the activity hostile
is when the target's management (and perhaps
some of the current owners) resist the raiders'
efforts to acquire the firm. For what purpose
the raider plans to apply his control of the target
company will vary but it is almost always moti
vated by the raider's financial gain. Some goals
have been to break-up a conglomerate target to
sell its component parts at a profit, to stream
line and run a more profitable component, to
replace an inefficient management or, more
prevalently recently, to incorporate the target's
6

6 Jack B. Jacobs, "Comments on Contestability," S4 Unk,€1'sity of
Miami Law Review 847 (2000).
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complementary assets into the raider's own for
greater productivity and future profits. Though
the purpose may vary, the method is the same.
The raider announees publicly an offer to buy
shares from current shareholders at a price
greater than the share's current stock market
price (the tender offer or bid). The method of
payment may vary: cash, stock in the raider's
company, bonds, etc., and the terms of the ten
der may vary: for example, purchase will be ex
ercised only on the condition that enough of the
outstanding shares are offered to the raider to
give it majority control in the target company.
Each of the current shareholders then must de
cide whether to tender his or her particular
shares to this bid offer. 7
What makes the situation "hostile" is not
the bid for the shares, but whether the man
agement (and perhaps significant minority
shareholders) of the target company is against
this change in controL In the U.S., the Board of
Directors has sole power to run the corporation.
The shareholders' power is in their right to de
termine the members of the Board through vot
ing-rights based on shares owned. A typical tar
get company, however, is a stock exchange
listed firm whose owners by and large constitute
a diffuse number of shareholders who are mostly
7 Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corpo
rate Jl.cquisitions, (2d cd. 1995).
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inattentive to issues of management and
unlikely to act concertedly if bothering to vote
at all. As a result, the current incumbent management usually has default control over the
Board's membership and has had so for some
time. Sometimes the management in such situations is referred to as the "entrenched" management. Unless the articles of incorporation or
bylaws preclude otherwise, if a majority shareholder (one who owns over 50% of the voting
shares) now emerges from the takeover efforts,
then that shareholder can choose at least the
majority, if not all, of the members of the Board
and through them control the firm.
It is most likely that the raider, upon
successful acquisition of above 50% of the voting
shares, will replace the incumbent Board with
members of the raider's choosing to pursue the
raider's plans for the company. Thus an incentive arises for the incumbent Board to use its
powers to thwart the success of the raider's tender offer. Though this is not always the reason
for management's resistance to external acquisition of its firm, it is one that is often proffered,
at least by the acquiring raider. Other arguments the defending management often gives for
resisting the takeover is that the company will
be more profitable remaining with the incumbent management or that the raider is not offering sufficient money for the shares. Though the
arguments vary on both Sides, the arguments
[168]
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begin when the attempt at acquisition becomes
hostile rather than friendly.
With the rise in the number of takeovers
in the United States came a greater interest in
the legal question of whether it was lawful for
the Board to prevent its company's shareholders
from accepting a tender offer bid at a premium
price. Early on, the courts concluded that de
spite the possible entrenchment incentives of
management, if their predominant motive was in
the best interest of the company, the manage
ment's action would be upheld. 8 Of course this
raised the legal and economic question of what
constituted acting in the best interest of the
company and what was persuasive evidence of
it.

As hostile takeover attempts increased,
the question of permissible activity intenSified.
Both raiders and incumbent managements de
veloped techniques and strategies to thwart
each other, many of which ended up in court for
review when the affected party complained.
Some strategies used by management were
"shark repellants" (rendering the company pre
emptively undesirable to some potential raider,
e.g., by selling off valuable assets or putting in
place some restrictive voting requirements),
8

Cheff '0. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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"white knights" (finding another company to
outbid the raider but who was friendly to the
incumbent management) and "greenmail" (authorizing the use of company assets to buy the
raider's stakehold of target's shares at a significant premium on the condition of the raider's
withdrawal.) Some techniques used by raiders
were pre-emptive announcements of offers (to
prevent management time to react), short time
frames for bid offers (to force current shareholders to decide quickly) and two-tiered offers
(giving a high price to the first shares tendered
and a sub-par price for the last shares in a subsequent forced sale after the takeover's success
and merger with target).
The thrusts and parries of strategies were
tested over time in the courts, forcing the courts
to define more clearly what was in the best interest of the corporation. The "best interests of
the corporation" evolved into the "maximization
of (current) shareholder value" and the courts'
subsequent evaluations of actions were based on
that criteria: (Did the nature of the offer coercively force the shareholder to sell or to sell prematurely against his or her best long term interests? 'Vas the management defense unwarrantedly preclusive of the shareholder's opportunity
to exercise his or her own judgment as to what
was the most valuable course of action?) Statutes at both federal and state levels imposed
rules and regulations to affect the course of a
[170]
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hostile takeover effort in order to maximize current shareholder value (disclosure rules, mandatory minimum durations of offers, withdrawal of
tenders by shareholders permitted (so as to accept better offers clsewhere)) and the "best
price rule" (all shareholdcrs receive the same
best price regardless of changes in bid price to
solicit more tenders).) (Williams Act and various state takeover statutes.)
The denouement was the development of
rights plans ("the poison pill") which were
amendments to corporate charters that automatically triggered a dilution of a company's
shares if a prelude to a hostile effort occurred.
The effect was to make any hostile attempt prohibitively expensive but also gave control to
management to revoke "the pill" before it was
triggered. This forced any prospective raider to
negotiate directly with the target's management
and reach a settlement before making any tender offer could begin. Tested in the courts, "the
poison pill" was found lawful as long as the
management used it to maximize shareholder
value (Moran v. Household Int'l, 1985), for example, to secure a better bid from another company. These poison pills have sometimes been
seen as contributing to the slowdown in hostile
takeovers in the early 1990's though studies
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have indicated otherwise (Coates IV, 2000).9
Today approximately 85% of the companies
listed on exchanges have adopted some form of
rights plan. Though it is often suggested that
managements have used the pill to extract some
protection or compensations for themselves
once a takeover is proposed, numerous studies
indicate that regardless, the rights plans have
increased significantly the premium the depart
ing shareholders receive. to
B. Hostile Takeover Regulation in the United

States Today
The issues debated in the U. S. today re
volve around whether current regulations, stat
utes and court rulings adequately insure maxi
mization of shareholder wealth while permitting
the market forces to discipline firms into main
taining economic efficiency.ll Generally, hostile
takeovers are viewed as playing an important
role in disciplining the participants in the mar
ketplace to be efficient. The underlying thread
of all the hostile takeover debates is that given
its expense and the offer of above-market-price
John C. Coates IV, "Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover
Defenses: \Vhere Do We Stand?," 54 University of Miami Law
Review 783 (2000).
10 [d.; R. Comment & G. Schwcrt, "Poison or Placebo? Evidence
on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modem Antitakeover
Measures," 39 Journal ofFinancial Economics 1 (1995).
11 Stephen Choi, "Regulating Investors Not Issuers: a Mar
ket-based Proposal," 88 California Law Review 279 (2000).
9
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premium to current shareholders, a hostile
takeover effort would not arise if there were not
significant economic efficiency gains (and there
fore profits) to be made by the acquirer which
are not being exploited by current management.
Particular attention is paid to the impediments
of the poison pill towards that end and how the
courts permit its useY Additional questions are
whether the current statutory regulations un
duly burden potential acquirers, inhibiting their
ability to move efficiently in taking over a firm
when indeed it is economically warranted. l3
C. Federal VS. State Control
In effect - legislatively and jurispruden
tially - the United States has evolved a standard
for the regulation and review of hostile take-over
activity that is largely uniform across the states,
though the impact of the variations that do exist
among the states' takeover statutes are still the
subject of debate. At the federal level, the Wil
liams Act of 1968 amended the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934, creating federal regulation
of hostile takeover activity by both the acquiring
and the target firms. The Act focuses on maxi
mizing the information to and the ability of the
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp, 651 A.2d 1361 (DeL
1995).
13 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, "A New Approach to
Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition," 87 Virginia Law
Review Hl( 2001),
12
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current shareholders faced with tender offers to
make the best decisions with regard to the value
of their shares. Subsequent to the passage of
the \Villiams Act, a wave of state level statutes
were passed to give directors of target compa
nies powers of resistance to hostile bids beyond
the Williams Act. After those statutes were de
clared by various courts to be unconstitutional
on the grounds that they interfered either with
interstate commerce or with the federal su
premacy of the \Villiams Act,14 the U.S. Supreme
Court15 nevertheless paved the way for a second
wave of state statutes to achieve similar results,
by allowing states to couch the provisions em
powering target managers in terms of the states'
powers to regulate corporate governance. It is
these variations among the states and their
regulatory impact that remain the subject of de
bate as to whether there is a need for more cir
cumscribing federal regulation. 16
More notably, for the concerns of the
European Union, regardless of the extent that
there are explicit federal rules and jurispru
dence as compared with state laws and court
decisions, the issue of the impact of hostile
takeovers on a particular state's well-being in
- - - - - - - -..- -...

~-

See, e.g., Edgar '0. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
CTS Corp. 'D. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 86-87 (1987).
16 See generally, William C. Tyson, "The Proper Relationship Be
tween Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers,"
66 Notre Dame Law Review 241 (1990).

14
15
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the U. S. has played little role in any legislation
or court opinions. Significant court decisions at
the state level, (most notably Delaware) have
had a persuasive impact on other state courts'
decisions with regard to business law matters,
and the conclusions of these courts emphasized
maximizing the current shareholders' wealth,
whether or not the shareholders were residents
of the state. Little concern was given to the impact that a takeover may have on the welfare of
the community in which the business resides.
Takeovers can sometimes lead to the closure of
local plants and layoffs, thereby altering the
daily life of the community. Though some court
decisions stated that Boards of Directors could
consider as a factor the impact on the community in its decision to as whether to forestall a
takeover offer (sometimes referred to as "stakeholder rights"), the effect of such statements
was relatively small. illtimately, the maximization of the wealth of the current shareholders
was the standard that held primacy in the
evaluation any of the players' activities in takeover struggles.
Since maximizing current shareholders'
value in the corporation disregards any community impact and there is no causal or economic
link between the shareholders' welfare and the
community's welfare (except to the extent, in
the rare event, that the shareholders themselves
are residents), when shareholders decide and
IUS GEKTIUM . Volume 9
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are able to accept (if the withdrawal of a poison
pill is required) an acquirer's offer to purchase
their shares at a premium above the market
price, the struggle is finished. The current
shareholders walk away with the proceeds from
their sale, the acquirer takes over the firm to its
own advantage and the consequences to the
employees and community in which the firm
resides fall where they might.
During the 80's, in the heyday of the hostile takeovers in the U.S., news organizations
and show business media spotlighted attention
on the community fallouts from the waves of
mergers and acquisitions. Acquirers were often
portrayed as voracious greedy vultures picking
on firms in a manner that destroyed a valuable
company and/or valued ways of community life
and doing so solely for the purpose of making
money. One merely needs to think of popular
movies on the subject produced at the time to
have a sense of public perception: Big Business
(1988, Comedy, Lily Tomlin, Bette Midler - a
corporate struggle over whether to close down a
factory that will also destroy a southern town's
way of life); Other People's Money (1991, Comedy, Danny DeVito - corporate raider's efforts to
acquire a local company that is the lifeblood of a
New England community); and the most notorious, 'Vall Street (1987, Drama, Michael Douglas,
Charlie Sheen, Martin Sheen - young ambitious
stock broker learns that his idol, a major corpo{176]
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rate raider, is really and can only bc greedy and
unscrupulous in order to be successful.) Even
in Pretty Woman (1990, Julia Roberts, Richard
Gere) , the hero, a successful, albeit ethically
questionable, corporate raider, is psychologically redeemed when he decides to keep one
corporate acquisition intact and build it up further instead of selling off its component parts for
profit. These movies and others like them mirrored the sentiments held by the United States
public at large regarding the disruption to corporations' and people's lives that the waves of
corporate acquisitions and mergers had caused.
News media gave similarly heart-rendering stories of families' and communities' lives in upheaval as a result of shifts in corporate winds.
Despite the popular sentiment of hostility
towards (and fascination with) the corporate
raiders and the concern for the disruption that
such activities were perceived to cause, court
deciSions and legislative efforts to regulate hostile takeover activity did very little to address
them. Roberta Romano, a leading U.S. scholar
in takeover activity, found little or no evidence
that state lobbyists or legislators were ever concerned for the negative impact on their communities or employment as a result of takeover activity. Indeed, their focus seemed to be solely
on empowering the incumbent management
with the capacity to forestall the success of tender-offer bids, a move she notes has the potenIUS GENTIUM· Volume 9
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tial to benefit the incumbent management, who
are local and operate in concert, at the expense
of shareholders who tend to be dispersed and
loosely if at all organized. 17 Ultimately, the poison pill and similar impediments to shareholder
acceptance force the potential acquirer to negotiate with management as to the terms of the
acquisition. Management usually suggests that
this secures the best price for shareholders, but
there is also suspicion that management uses
these tools to extract benefits for itself (for example, lucrative severance benefits or promises
to keep the management on). It is the extent to
which the various state statutes regulating hostile takeovers empowers the incumbent management to thwart shareholders from accepting
tender offer bids and effectively extracting compensation for themselves that are the subject of
scholarly and policy debates. I8
Roberta Romano, "Competition for Corporate Charters and
the Lesson of Takeover Statutes," 61 Fordham L. Rev. 843, 854S6 (1993). She suggests that most state takeover statutes were
lobbied for by the management of firms who were either the target or potentially a target for an acquisition bid. She also noted
that the local bar (of attorneys) of each state typically supported
such lcgislation as well and she makes the pOint that onee a takeover occurs, the acquirer continues to rely on its own legal
cOlmsel and not the ones of the target.
18 For example, see the articles presented at the University of
Chicago 2002 Symposium on Executive Compensation and
Takeover which continue the discussion. See, in particular: Jennifcr Arlen, "Designing Mechanisms to Govern Takeover Defenses: Private Contracting, Legal Intervention, and Unforeseen
Contingencies," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 917; Lucian Bebohuk, "The
Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers," 69 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 973; Maroel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, "How I Learned to
17

[178}

IUS GENTIUM· Fall 2003

Regulation of Hostile Takeovers
Nevertheless, but for the issue of management compensation, it is the use of the
maximization of current shareholder value as
the benchmark for review that renders regulation of takeover activity essentially uniform
across the United States, regardless of whether
one looks at federal or state regulation.

III.

THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE

A. The Advent of Cross-Border Hostile
Takeovers

Hostile takeovers were not a focus in
Europe until 1987 when the Italian entrepreneur Carlo De Benedetti sought to acquire Belgium's crown jewel of business: Societe Generale de Belgique. Since then, the incidents of
takeovers have increased dramaticallyl9 not only
in crossing national boundaries but in increasing in financial significance as well. The largest
takeover in history was the acquisition by UK's
Vodafone of Germany's Mannesmann in 1999.

--------------

-~-----

Stop Worrying and Love The Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law," 69 U. Chi. L. Re'O. 871; and Martin Lipton, "Pills,
Polls, and Professors Redux," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037
19 Yvette Merchiers, "De bescherming van minderheden in
rechtspersonen" (Protection of the Rights of Minority Shareholders) in X., Rechtspersonenrecht, Postuniversaitaire CJ'Clus Willy
Delva 1998-1999, Gent, Mys & Breesch, 1999, 259-307.
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Interestingly, the rise of hostile takeovers in
Europe ooinoides with the EU's effort to harmonize oompany law throughout its member nations. As a result, oonsiderable attention has
fooused on hostile takeover regulation not only
by scholars but by legislators and policy-makers
among the European nations and within the
European Union itself. As noted earlier, despite
efforts from many quarters, the EU's Takeover
Directive was voted down after 12 years of what
appeared to be extremely suooessful negotiations among member nations, refleoting the divergenoe of opinion among the nations as to
how they want to protect and facilitate their
oompanies' activities. As already stated, it was
olear that Germany's experienoe of the takeover
of Mannesman by British Vodaphone had a major impact on the vote on the EU direotive.
What is important to appreoiate is that
when a oompany is taken over by another in an
international oontext, the new owners of the
target oompany are usually not natives of the
country of residenoe of the aoquired oompany.
So now Mannesmann, a German company, is no
longer German owned, it is owned by a British
company. It still employs Germans, it still resides in Germany, but it is now owned by foreigners. Sooiete Generale de Belgique was not
only one of the most signifioant oompanies in
the Belgium eoonomy but it was also a source of
national pride. Though De Benedetti's efforts
[180]
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were thwarted, ultimately Societe Generale
through the defensive tactic of finding a 'Vhite
Knight now has French owners.
B. The Economic Goals of the EU and Takeover
Regulation

1. The Goals in General
One of the oldest economic theories that
has driven most modernizations of economies is
that freedom of trade produces economic gains
for all participants, whether they are individu
als, companies, or nations; that each participant
to a freely negotiated transaction comes away
better off than before. 20 Furthermore, the en
hancement of the well-being of some ultimately
translates into the enhancement of well-being of
many as the increases in income increases pur
chases from others thereby increasing their in
come. 21 This leads to economic growth and is
considered a hallmark of the benefits of eco
nomic efficiency.
One of the underlying motives of the EU
has been to create a larger union consisting of
member nations, so they can take advantage of
20 This goes back as far as Adam Smith's invisible hand theory in
his "Wealth of Natiol1s" (Modern Library Edition, 1937).
21 This is the famous "multiplier effect" first promulgated by
John Maynard Keynes in GE~ERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYME~T,
INTEREST Al'lD MONEY (1936).

IUS
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the economic power and growth this could gen
erate and improve all member nations' econo
mies and well-being. The founders of the ED
recognized from the beginning that in order to
be successful in their goals, they would need a
free flow of capital, goods, services and people
among the member nation states, and they in
cluded these principles in the agreements
signed. 22 The European nations have long been
the subject of criticism for their legal and struc
tural impediments to the free movement of eco
nomic forces that would take advantage of these
potential economic gains. 23 The European na
tions each had their own restrictions on the flow
of resources, goods and services through tariffs,
import-export quotas, rules on the structures of
companies and immigration laws among other
aspects. To overcome the effect of these obsta
cles, efforts to harmonize of laws among the
several nations of the ED also included the goal
of reducing the barriers to trade among the
member nations.

2. The Takeover Friction
Along with the reduction in barriers to

22 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.8. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome),
Art. 3.
23 See generally, Jonathan S. Chester, The Proposed Regulation
of Corporate Tender Qffers in the European Community, 12
N.Y.L. Soh. J. Int'} & Compo L. 481 (1991).

[182]
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trade also came the reduction in impediments to
hostile takeovers that crossed national boundaries. The effect of this on national psychology
may not have been adequately anticipated. Different nations now within the EU, as a result of
feeling "invaded" by other countries' corporate
entrepreneurs, have taken to questioning
whether indeed they want to remove all barriers
to the free flow of productive resources. Part of
what enabled Societe Generale de Belgique to
fend off the Italian entrepreneur De Benedetti's
efforts to acquire shareholder control was the
willingness of French executives and officials to
join forces with Societe Generale because of
their own anger at Italian in-roads into ownership of French companies. In the end, $3 billion
was spent collectively by all sides in this takeover war, resulting in De Benedetti's defeat and
French ownership of the company. Societe Generale itself was only worth about half that
amount according to share market prices.
Though the effect of the hostile takeover
efforts regarding Societe Generale made it clear
that the European nations needed to put in
place rules and regulations regarding such activities (the UK was at the time the only nation
that had any effective regulation of takeover activity), it also made clear that the inherent
structure of companies themselves needed to be
re-examined, nation by nation, because the
structures themselves often prohibited frce
IUS GENTIUM· Volume 9
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movements of resources that would serve to
"discipline" existing corporations into becoming
more efficient. 24 Issues such as the percentage
of company ownership that is closed and not
public ally traded, the degree of leverage (i.e.,
the extent the corporation is financed through
loans rather than equity), the extent to which
large institutional banks finance companies giving them tremendous control over market
forces, and regulations limiting shareholders'
right to vote, are among the many factors of
company structure that are seen to limit the
free flow of trade and the concomitant forces of
market-induced efficiency in inducing companies to be more productive.
But what is also clear is that national
pride has served to introduce new factors for
consideration in addition to the goal of achieving unfettered (or at least "less fettered") market dynamics. Making the company structure
more liquid and more mobile also introduced it
to vulnerability to hostile takeovers. Examining
Germany's actions prior to the European Parliament's vote on the ED Directive for regulating
Hostile takeovers and Germany's decisions after
the vote failed to adopt the directive are instruc--.-.---~-------------

24 The prevailing view as to why Societe Generale became a target to a hostile take-over is that is was poorly run with inefficient
management. See Jonathan Kapstein et al., How Di Benedetti
Botched the "Battle of Belgium", Bus. Wk., Mar. 7, 1988, at 44-46.
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tive, particularly when compared to United
States state takeover statutes in conjunction
with the United States Williams Act.

3. The Case of Germany and the Failure of EU
Takeover Directive
Upon the aftermath of the Vodaphone
takeover of Mannesman in 1999, Germany decided to implement mandatory takeover regulation which had not been in place before. Most
of the proposed law had goals similar to the Williams Act in the United States. It sought to
make information available to shareholders, to
give them reasonable time to decide and other
measures. Most of the design was to follow the
principle of maximizing current shareholder
value. However, one area that was in controversy was the extent to which the target boards
could adopt defensive measures in face of a hostile bid. Though the German advisory commission for the act leaned heavily towards restricting board actions to maintaining positions of
neutrality during a takeover bid, German politicians, trade associations and members of industry objected fairly strenuously and wanted the
scope of the board's powers greatly enlarged to
enable them to resist hostile bids. Ultimately a
compromise position was adopted which enabled target boards to adopt defensive measures
under some limited restrictions and with the
caveat that if the measures fell within the scope
IUS GENTIUM· Volume 9
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of authority of the shareholders, the measures
had to be approved by the current shareholders.
However, these measures could be adopted in
advance of any particular bid, allowing the
board to take pre-emptive defensive actions and
outside the context of an potentially attractive
tender offer.
Simultaneously, Germany also focused on
what was transpiring regarding takeovers at the
level of the European Union. Germany pro
posed a measure to be included in the discus
sions forming the European Union's own Take
over Directive. Like Germany's statute, the EU's
Takeover Directive was also developing along
United States lines in that the provisions were
oriented towards the maximizing of shareholder
value. The measure Germany proposed was to
permit target boards broad latitude in adopting
defensive measures. The proposal was intro
duced in the latter stages of the EU Conciliation
Proceedings but was ultimately rejected. Even
though the EU draft had adopted 15 amend
ments to allow for national differences, it main
tained its strongly held position that target
boards behave neutrally in the face of a hostile
bid. Hence while Germany was developing its
own takeover statute that granted powers to tar
get boards to take defensive measures in the
face of a hostile bid, the ED was developing a
takeover directive under the principle of board
neutrality, rejecting suggestions of giving boards
[186]
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more latitude.
illtimately when the EU Takeover Direc
tive was put before the European Parliament on
July 4 2001, the Parliament came to a deadlock
decision, Germany being one of the negative
votes cast. In the meantime Germany's own
Takeover Act, which allowed for defensive tac
tics by target boards, was passed in the German
legislature on November 2001 and came into
force in January, 2002.
Currently, there is no EU Takeover Direc
tive in force and a new proposal for the EU is
being developed. This proposal still maintains
the same basic approach of constraining the tar
get board to neutrality. The one exception to
the rule of neutrality the new proposal intro
duces is that target boards can take defensive
measures but only upon shareholder approval
and only after a bid has been made and the
shareholders are fully apprised of its nature.
This gives little teeth to the power of the board
to resist offers. It basically rests on whether the
shareholders as a voting group want to reject the
current offer and believe that the current board
can some how do better for them, either in se
curing a better offer or managing the company
to yield greater profits. Whether this revised
proposal will succeed remains to be seen. It will
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probably not be put before a formal vote until
the year 2005. 25
IV. EU's HARMONIZATION VS. SUBSIDIARITY CONTRA
U.S. FEDERAL VS. STATES RIGHTS: TAKEOVER
REGULATION

Ironically, the direction of the EU Take
over Directive is precisely consistent with the
preferences of the American critics of the cur
rent U. S. system. Many U.S. scholars feel the
state-level takeover statutes that empower
boards of directors to resist offers are not only
self-serving for the board at the cost of share
holder wealth but also economically inefficient
for the economy as a whole. Such board powers
interfere with the market discipline of corporate
management: the threat of hostile takeovers in
duce management to run the company more ef
ficiently or face the possibility of being pushed
out. This is at the heart of the criticism of the
state takeover statutes among the states of the
United States and it is the heart of the orienta
tion of the EU Directives in favor of board neu
trality.
However, as noted in the beginning of this

For an overview comparison of the German Takeover Statute
\vith the EU Takeover Directive and their respective histories, see
Daniela Favoccia, Recent Developments in German JH&A Trans
actions, 1347 PLI/Corp 955 (2002).
25
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essay, when the criticism is raised with regard
to the United States and the various states' takeover statutes, any concern for protection from
owners of another state does not loom very large
on the radar screen of considerations. Though
some bemoan the loss of a way of life, the concerns for the lost culture or community, seem to
fade rather easily. In the United States, these
cultures and communities do not have centuries
of history behind them. On the other hand,
among the European nations, the free flow of
resources, services and people often means an
invasion by peoples from one culture by ownership of enterprises in another culture. And in
this instance the cultures are identities that go
back very far.
It is not clear what the fallout of a poten-

tial melting pot of such diverse and longstanding
cultures will be. Based on economic efficiency
arguments, the members of the ED may have to
make a choice in the trade-off between more
economic well-being and the preservation of national and cultural identity. There is some evidence that countries are indeed willing to sacrifice some economic gains for the preservation of
a way of life. Certainly Germany's current takeover regulations empowering the boards of directors to resist hostile bids reflect that choice.
But in doing so, they not only risk some loss of
economic advances but also the potential for
boards to use these powers for their own ecoIUS GENTIU1vl . Volume 9
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nomic gain.26
IV. HOSTILE TAKEOVER LAW IN THE FUTURE

A. Varying perspectives
Although shareholder wealth maximiza
tion is the most widely held paradigm for pro
moting maximum economic growth and effi
ciency, it is not altogether clear that it is the
only one that will achieve economic ends. Cer
tainly the underlying principle of unfettered
markets has over time been modified with con
straints to deal with a number of social values
such as: preventing pollution, preserving natural
habitats, avoiding destructive goods such as
(now illegal) drugs, providing health care, a high
level research, education, armed services, regu
lation of communications, securities, private
property, public goods, and criminal activity.
Though the criticisms of interference in the
market-place tend to hold up the paradigm of
unfettered markets in the abstract, it is clear
that in the reality, no one believes in truly un
regulated market places. Which constraints one
Despite Mannesmann's strenuous fight against Vodaphone's
takeover, ultimately its CEO, Klaus Esser, recommended that the
shareholders accept Vodaphone's increased offer. However,
Esser was promised 30 million Euros from the new combined en
tity (1 Euro is roughly $1 depending on the exchange rates of the
moment.) Charles M. Nathan & Michael R Fischer, "An Overview
of Takeover Regimes in the United Kingdom, France And Ger
many," 1347 PLI/Corp 1163, 1195 (2002).
26
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might support may vary with the political per
spective of the individual, but perfect unregu
lated markets are not in fact held as the ideal
path to the best social and economic welfare.
This probably holds, in particular, for optimal
takeover regulation.
Certainly, there is still enough support for
deviations from the perfect shareholder maximi
zation modeL27 Various analyses focusing on
global aspects of takeover regulation span the
spectrum of whether the shareholder maximiza
tion model \\ill naturally predominate an ulti
mate universal modes or whether structural and
political differences will determine different
Some assert that
(sub-optimal) outcomes. 29
Europe (and the world) will inevitably gravitate
to the U.S. model,3o while others assert that the
initial differences in different economies will
perpetuate differences even as nations evolve

27 In addition to some of the articles mentioned in footnote 8,
see also Mark J. Roe, "Can Culture Constrain the Economic
:vlodel of Corporate Law?," 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1251(2002); Mark
J. Loewenstein, "Stakeholder Proteotion in Germany and Japan",
76 Tnl. L. Rev. 1673 (2002); and Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law", 89 Geo. L. J.
439,458 (2001).
28 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for
Corporate Law", 89 Georgetown Law Journal 439 (2001).
29 Mark J. Roe, "Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,"
109 Harvard. I.-aw Review 641 (1996).
30 Robcrta S. !\armel, "Is it Time for a Federal Corporation
Law?," 57 Brooklyn Law Review 55, 90 (1991).
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globally,31 A number of studies have examined
differences in economic structure: thc degree of
shareholder diffusion compared with concen
trated blocks of controlling coalitions 32 or the
liquidity of a nation's securities markets and its
relationship to concentration of ownership,33
Some examine the differences in corporate gov
ernance: the role shareholders play in direct de
cision making/4 the role financial intermediaries
play35 and the role unions play,3S Some look at
political and governmental institutions: the im

Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, "A Theory of Path De
pendence in Corporate Ownership and Governance," S2 Stan
ford Law Review 127 (1999).
32 William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, "Comparative Corpo
rate Governance and the Theorv of the Firm: The Case
Against Global Cross Reference,.,- 38 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law 213 (1999); European Corporate Govern
ance Network, "The Separation of Ownership and Control: A
Survey of Seven European Countries," (1997).
33 R. La Porta, F, Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny,
"Legal Determinants of External Finance," S2 Journal of Fi
nance, 1131 (1997); R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A.
Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, "Law and Finance," Journal of Po
litical Economy, 106 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, "Measuring
the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems:
Toward a More Scientific Approach," 10 Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance 16 (1998); Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee, Jr., "Hail Britannia'?: Institutional Investor Behavior
Under Limited Regulation," 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 (1994).
34 Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Pathways to Corporate Convergence?
Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in Ger
many," 5 Columbia Journal of European Law_219 (1999).
35Ronald J. Gilson, "Corporate Governance and Economic Effi
ciency: When Do Institutions Matter?," 74 Washington Univer
sity Law Quarterly 327 (1996).
36 Guido Ferrarini, "Share Ownership, Takeover Law and the
Contestability of Corporate Control," Company Law Reform
in OECD Countries. A Comparative Outlook of Current
Trends, Conference Proeeedings (forthcoming 2001).
31
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pact of EU activities/ the reach of U.S. laws
abroad 38 and comparisons of different nations'
regulations of takeovers 39 or the impact of law
itself40 in providing protection and disruptions.
Some analyses consider the transportability of
statutory regulation across nations and whether
transplants of legal and structural features from
one political and economic culture to another
will yield success. 41
Debates range over which industrial re
gimes are superior to others, strong financial
intermediaries versus liquid stock market, high

Nihat Aktas, Erio de Bodt, & Michel Levasseur, "The Informa
tion Impact of thc European CommiSSion Interventions In the
Field of Merger and Aoquisition Monitoring: The Economics Be
hind Information Flow Coming to the Market," Institut
d'Administration et de Gestion, Universite Catholique de Lou
vain, (2001).
38 Merritt B. Fox, "Securities Disclosure in a GlobaIizing Market:
Who Should Regulate Whom," 95 Michigan Law Review 2498
(1997); Merritt B. Fox, "The Political Eoonomy of Statutory
Reach: U.s. Disclosure Rules in a GlobaIizing Market for Securi
ties," 97 },Iichigan Law Review 696 (1998).
39 Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran, & David A. Christman,
"Toward a Cohesive International Approaoh to Cross-border
TakeoverRegulation," 51 University of Miami Law Review 823
(1997).
40 John C. Coffee, Jr., "The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Im
plications," 93 Northwestern Law Review 641 (1999).
41 William Bratton & Joseph McCahery, "Comparative Corpo
rate Governance and the Theorv of the Firm: The Case
Against GlobaI Cross Reference",- 38 Columbia Journal of
Transnational Law_213 (1999); Roberta Romano, "A Cau
tionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate
Law," 102 Yale Law Journal 2021 (1993).
37
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concentration versus diffuse ownership, protec
tion of management versus facilitation of raid
ers. The views as to what forms and contexts
are superior have changed over time as once
flourishing countries such as Japan and Ger
many, whose corporate regime was far more in
stitutionally controlled than the U.S., have sub
sequently fallen are harder times while the
U.S.'s economy began to bloom again. 43 \Vith the
economic rise and fall and rise again of different
countries' economies, each under a different
regulatory and structural environment, it is now
clear that it is not unambiguous that one model
of corporate governance and economic struc
tural environment is superior to another. Fur
thermore, this conclusive non-conclusion arises
especially in the context of evaluating success in
purely economic wealth-maximizing terms.

B. The questions that need to be asked
It is important to recognize the possibility
that a multiplicity of economic contexts can co
exist internationally44 without interfering with

42 Geoffrey Miller, "Political Structure and Corporate Govern
ance: Some Points of Contrast between the United States and
England," 1998 GolumbiaBusiness Law Review 52.
43 John C. Coffee, Jr., "The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Im
plications," 93 Northwestern Law Review 641 (1999).

Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran, & David A. Christman,
"Toward a Cohesive International Approach to Cross-border

44
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overall global efficiency. Furthermore it is quite
plausible that this co-existing multiplicity of
economic regimes may also possess the flexibil
ity to incorporate other social values in con
junction with economic measures of the nation's
welfare and to do so without compromising its
economy's efficiency to compete internationally.
Certainly the suggestions of a number of authors
at the very least do not preclude that possibil
ity.45 On a practical level, it is evident that these
other social values play a significant role in de
termining policy, not only among the several
nations of the ED but within the ED itself.
Global economic policy considering hostile
takeovers will have to take European sensibili
ties into account.

TakeoverRegulation," 51 University of Miami Law Review 823
(1997).
45 Roberta Romano, "Empowering Investors: a Market Approach
to Securities Regulation," 107 Yale Law Journal 2359 (1998);
Frank J. Garcia, "Protecting Nonshareholder Interest in the Mar
ket for Corporate Control: A Role for State Takeover Statutes,"
23 University ofMichigan Journal ofLaw Reform 507 (1990).
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